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Examining Moral Necessity in the Kontion Categorical Imperative could n?t be 
k 
. the basis of 
Mar E. Horns a law. When 
M o:al necessi~ is the idea that specific imperatives bmd the actiOns of a moral agent regardless of his or her personal goals or wishes. Contemporary ethi-
cists have debated whether the moral system of Immanuel Kant 
includes rules which do in fact bind necessarily on the moral 
agent. This paper will argue that Kant's categorical imperative 
does not bind necessarily. The three different formulas given for 
the categorical imperative can each be used to derive different 
moral rules. If varying and conflicting rules can be constructed 
depending on which formula is used, then it is impossible to 
know which rule, if any, binds necessarily. Thus the Kantian 
deontological system, though based in reason, does not show 
how moral necessity can be derived from reason. However, this 
failure does not preclude the existence of moral necessity. It is 
even sti ll possible that necessity could rest its foundations on 
reason, though Kant has not shown that such a foundation exists. 
It is important to note this failure since many modem-day Kan-
tian ethicists argue for necessary moral rules and actions based 
in reason and the categorical imperative. 1 Their arguments and 
moral prescriptions must be ignored or substantially amended 
if the Kantian perspective is suspect. Furthermore, a fai lure or 
contradiction present in Kantian philosophy would mean that a 
new, sound deontological morality would be needed. 
In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant relies 
on a foundation of a priori universal concepts to establish the 
categorical imperative, which is the cornerstone of his deonto-
logicaJ2 moral framework.3 With this imperative, he develops a 
law-conception of ethics in which adherence to a moral law de-
termines the permissibility of an action. A person wi ll often feel 
that he or she will have to do a particular action. This having to 
is what Kant most wants to explain. He believes that if a law is 
to hold morally "as a ground of obligation," then it "must carry 
with it absolute necessity."4 He finds that a moral law based on 
empirical facts could not carry with it necessity since empirical 
facts do not apply identically to all rational agents. Thus his ethi-
cal system depends solely on reason.5 
In attempting to explain necessity, he assumes that there actu-
ally are moral duties. He considers "duty" to be equivalent to 
moral necessity. A duty is thus something that a person is bound 
to do.6 Necessity binds regardless of personal interests, since 
a personal interest would represent a mo- tive and 
3 
these inclina-
tions are dispensed with as mor-
ally impertinent, only the law 
and respect for the law can de-
termine the wi ll.7 
Since there IS nothing per-
sonal about the law which binds 
a person to duty, then the law 
must bind all rational beings. 
Kant calls this law the categori-
cal imperative, since it binds re-
gardless of a person's interests. 
Practical rules which are not uni-
versally binding he refers to as 
hypothetical imperatives, since 
they depend on a person's indi-
vidual interests. The substance 
of the categorical imperative is 
essentially "do your duty," but 
Kant formulates this instruction 
in various ways. The first formu-
lation he gives is derived from 
his conclusion that the law must 
bind on all rational beings: "Act 
only m accordance with that 
maxim through which you can at 
the same time will that it become 
a universal law." Essentially, 
this formulation states that one 
must conform any particular ac-
tion to a general rule or maxim, 
such as "do not lie" or "do not 
steal." Whatever rule one choos-
es, one must act according to a 
rule which could be followed by 
all rational beings. If one acts 
according to one's personal in-
terests, which are not shared by 
all rational beings, then not all 
moral agents can act in the same 
way. Since the moral law must 
be able to bind on all persons, 
this formulation stresses the re-
quirement of universalizability 
for all moral maxims. 
Kant goes on to discuss how 
the basis of the categorical im-
perative lies also in the rational 
nature of free persons. He says 
that the first formula necessitat-
ing that rational beings consider 
universally the maxim of their 
actions must be connected "with 
the concept of the will of a ra-
tional being as such. "8 In other 
words, one must have a will ca-
pable of reason to even be able 
to consider maxims in this way. 
A will is essentially the abil-
ity to determine one's own ac-
tions in accordance with laws 
or rules.9 The will then becomes 
Kant's basis for the second for-
mulation of the categorical im-
perative. Kant states that "every 
rational being exists as an end 
in itself, not merely as a means 
to be used by this or that will at 
its discretion." 10 Essentially, be-
cause rational persons have the 
ability to determine themselves, 
they must not be determined by 
others, since this would violate 
the freedom inherent to having 
a will. He says that "an end in 
itself has not merely a relative 
worth ... but an inner worth, that 
is, dignity." 11 To treat a person 
as a means to some other end 
would deny that they have an 
inner worth and tread upon his 
or her inherent dignity. From 
these ideas emerges the sec-
ond formula of the categorical 
imperative: "Act that you use 
humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time 
as an end, never merely as a 
means."12 Essentially, one must 
not " use" a person to get some-
thing else, but must instead treat 
every rational being with re-
spect. This applies universally 
to the actions of every rational 
agent since every rational being 
that an agent comes in contact 
with has his or her own will and 
the right to self-determination 
that comes with it. 
Kant's ethical law rests, then, 
on reason, impartiality, and dig-
nity. The further relevant ques-
tion concerning the basis of his 
system is who authors this law. 
Kant answers: 
We see philosophy put in a 
precarious position, which IS 
to be firm even though there is 
nothing in heaven or earth from 
which it depends or on which it 
is based. Here philosophy is to 
manifest its purity as sustainer 
of its own laws, not as herald 
of laws that an implanted sense 
[ ] h. . 13 . . . w 1spers to It. 
In this passage Kant makes 
clear that, not only does the 
moral law not rest on empiri-
cal or earthly facts, but it also 
does not gain its authority from 
a divine mandate. G. E. M. Ans-
com be and Alasdair Macintyre, 
twentieth-century detractors 
of Kant, have argued that God 
would have to be the author of 
the moral law in order for it to 
bind necessarily, but Kant be-
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lieves that such authorship is 
unnecessary. 14• 15 Kant says that 
the divine will, being perfectly 
good, is not determined by any-
thing other than the law. There 
is no moral "ought" imperative 
on the divine will, since its vo-
lition is necessarily in accor-
dance with the law; however, 
neither does the law emanate 
from the divine will. 16 Rather, 
the law comes from philosophy, 
or reason.17 
Reason does not operate by 
itself; rather, it is found exclu-
sively in rational persons. Thus 
Kant believes that a rational 
agent authors the moral law for 
himself or herself, rather than 
having any external authority 
impose the law on him or her. 
If an externality were to author 
the law, there would have to be 
an external incentive.18 A rule 
relying on an external incentive 
amounts only to a hypothetical 
imperative, one that a person 
will only act on if one desires 
the attached incentive, rather 
than a categorical imperative 
that applies universally regard-
less of interests or desires. Thus 
since the categorical imperative 
cannot be authored externally, it 
must be authored by one's own 
reason. One legislates the law to 
oneself and wills that one's ac-
tions be conformed to the law. 
Though Kant articulates this 
concept of self-legislation, he 
does not then believe that mo-
rality is relative. He believes 
that all agents reasoning well 
will arrive at the same con-
elusions about the moral law. 
Rather than seeing morality as a 
matter of opinion or preference 
dictated by personal interests, 
he views it as the equivalent of 
mathematics or logic. 19 There 
is a metaphysical component 
to morality that makes it ob-
each person would have some 
part in interpreting the categori-
cal imperative, which forms an 
overarching template for laws, 
into specific rules for the com-
munity. Since everyone would 
be involved, each autonomous 
person would be able to agree 
moral system cannot be derived 
from any single formula of the 
categorical imperative. The 
three formulas he gives for the 
categorical imperative can be 
used to derive different moral 
rules. Because of the possibil-
ity of different rules, one can-
jective. 20 Just as a 
person constructs 
objective math-
ematical principles 
through reason and 
applies those princi-
ples to arrive at re-
al-world solutions, 
so also does a ratio-
.. . contrary to his claim, the 
entire moral system cannot 
be derived from any single 
formula of the categorical 
imperative. 
not know which rule, if any, 
binds necessarily. 
As shown above, Kant 
believes reason places cer-
tain constraints on what the 
moral law is, namely that 
a given edict can only be 
a moral law under certain 
conditions: the edict must 
be able to be followed by nal person construct 
objective moral principles and 
apply those principles to deter-
mine his or her actions. 
Part of the reason Kant be-
lieves that all rational agents 
will arrive at the same conclu-
sions is that he expects them to 
reason together. He asserts the 
"worthiness of every rational 
subject to be a lawgiving mem-
ber in the kingdom of ends."21 
By a "kingdom of ends," he 
means a society of persons in 
which the autonomy of each 
individual to be an end unto 
himself or herself is uncompro-
misingly respected. 22 In such a 
society, no person would be un-
willingly subjected to decisions 
made for him or her by anoth-
er individual or by the state. 
Rather, each person would 
contribute in the community's 
determination of which moral 
imperatives were necessary and 
logically merited for bringing 
societal order. In other words, 
with the imperatives and with 
the reasoning for them; hav-
ing agreed, each agent would 
be able to hold himself or her-
self accountable for adhering to 
them. By this process of reason-
ing through, agreeing to, and 
adhering to the community's 
rules, Kant believes that each 
person is "self- legis lating" the 
imperatives. He or she is bring-
ing the rule to bear on his or her 
own actions. 
Thus, Kant builds an ethical 
theory on the will and reason 
of rational agents. The moral 
necessity of his system lies in 
the need for universalizable 
maxims and dignity-respecting 
actions, so that maxims can ap-
ply consistently to all rational 
beings and the autonomy of all 
agents remains intact. However, 
the discussion that follows will 
show that Kant's project fails 
because , 
his claim, 
.....-----, 
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contrary to 
the entire 
any rational being; any actions 
following from the edict must 
not compromise the autonomy 
of any rational being; and the 
edict should promote a society 
in which all rational beings are 
treated as autonomous ends. 
However, these constraints do 
not tell the actual content of the 
moral law; they merely tell the 
general form of the law. 
Moral rules outlining the spe-
cific content of the law must be 
deduced from the categorical 
imperative. Kant believes that 
the three forms of the categori-
cal imperative, each of which 
corresponds to one of the three 
conditions just mentioned, 
are three versions of the same 
rule. Because he believes that 
all moral rules can be deduced 
from the categorical imperative, 
and he believes the three formu-
las of the imperative to be giv-
ing the same message, he also 
believes that all moral rules can 
be wholly deduced from any 
single formula.23 In fact, he says 
that one should be able to make 
"a complete characterization of 
all maxims" by means of any of 
the three formulas. 24 
His view that all three for-
mulas are derived from reason 
makes this last point essential 
to his project. If it is impossible 
to deduce all necessary moral 
rules from any one of the three 
formulas provided by reason, 
then Kant has not shown how 
reason can be used to support 
moral necessity. If reason leads 
a person to deduce two or more 
viable rules for the same set 
of actions, then reason has not 
shown that any of the rules de-
duced must necessarily be fol-
lowed. Showing that conflicting 
rules can be deduced from dif-
ferent formulas , as laid out be-
low, would show that Kant has 
not established moral necessity. 
There are two common inter-
pretations of what Kant means 
by "reason," especially as it 
pertains to the universalizabil-
ity of moral rules prescribed in 
the first formula. Reason can 
be seen as describing either 
pure logic or practical reason. 
If one takes reason as meaning 
"pure logic," then saying that 
a moral rule is universalizable 
simply means that the results 
of universalizing the rule are 
logically possible. If all ratio-
nal agents can actually keep the 
rule simultaneously, then it is 
universalizable. For example, 
under this interpretation the first 
formula would indicate that a 
maxim calling for slavery is 
not universalizable. Slavery re-
quires that there be both slaves 
and slave-owners. It is not logi-
cally possible for all persons to 
be enslaved, since such a situa-
tion would not allow for the ex-
istence of slave-owners. 
The exerctse above shows 
that one can deduce a maxim 
against slavery from the first 
formula of the imperative. It is 
also evident that the same max-
im can be deduced from the sec-
ond and third formulas. Slavery 
by definition does not respect 
the autonomy of the slave, and 
it does not allow for a society in 
which all people are treated as 
ends-in-themselves. Thus slav-
ery is addressed consistently by 
all three formulas of the rule. 
One knows what rule to follow 
concerntng slavery smce the 
categorical imperative only al-
lows for one rule. 
However, not all moral rules 
can be deduced consistently 
from the various formulas when 
one interprets reason to mean 
"pure logic." For example, Kant 
believes that making a false 
promise is an immoral action, 
and he shows from the second 
formula how the categorical im-
perative prohibits this action.25 
It is easy to see how such a pro-
hibition can be derived from the 
formula concerning rational au-
tonomy. Making a false promise 
would prevent a rational being 
from be- ing able to 
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make an informed decision. 
However, a world in which 
everyone makes false promises 
is not a logical impossibility, 
but merely inconvenient. One 
can readily imagine a world in 
which no one believes promises 
because all promises may be 
false. Thus, if one interprets rea-
son to mean purely logic, then a 
prohibition against false prom-
ises cannot be derived from the 
first formula concernmg the 
universalizability of maxims. 
Alternatively, if one inter-
prets " reason" to be referring 
to practical reason, one is able 
to derive the prohibition against 
false promises from the first 
formula of the categorical im-
perative. It would not be rea-
sonable for false promises to be 
universally allowable. No one 
would ever believe any prom-
ises made, even if the person 
making the promise intended to 
keep it. People would eventu-
ally stop making promises al-
together, which would certain-
ly not be a practical situation. 
Thus it would be practically 
reasonable to have a prohibition 
against making false promises. 
Promises would then still be 
made and still be believed. 
However, the practical con-
siderations concerning promis-
es are their believability and the 
consequences of the promise 
not being fulfilled. If a promise 
is believable, then the promisee 
can act based on it, whether or 
not it is a true or false promise. 
Further, if a promisor suffers no 
negative consequences for fail-
ing to fulfill a promise,26 then 
the practical benefits of prom-
ises are not interrupted should 
he or she make a false promise. 
The promisor will still be be-
lieved in future acts of prom-
ising. For example, one could 
make a false promise in com-
plete confidence to a trusting 
person on his or her deathbed. 
The person would believe the 
promisor and there would be no 
negative consequences for this 
false promise-maker when the 
oath goes unfulfilled. 
A rule allowing only false 
promises that would be be-
lieved and that would lack neg-
ative consequences would be 
equally practically reasonable 
to a maxim prohibiting all false 
promises. If one makes only 
false promises of this kind, no 
one would hold promises sus-
pect and promises would still be 
made. All rational agents could 
make such promtses without 
compromising the practicality 
of promise-making, thus pre-
serving universalizability of the 
maxtm. 
Consequently, when reason 
is taken to have a practical con-
sideration, there are at least two 
possible rules concerning false 
promises that could be univer-
salized. One prohibits all false 
promises. The other permits 
only a certain kind of false 
promise for the sake of practi-
cality. Both rules could be fo l-
lowed at all times and at all 
all rational agents. However, the 
second and third formulas still 
call for the general prohibition 
of false promises. Thus, even 
under a different interpretation 
of the meaning of reason, the 
categorical imperative can still 
yield inconsistent rules to gov-
ern a single action. Even when 
one considers practical reason, 
one cannot necessarily know 
which rule should be followed. 
The formula concerning au-
tonomy of persons and the for-
mula concerning a kingdom of 
ends always calls for a prohibi-
tion against making any false 
promises. However, one can-
not derive that same rule with 
surety from the· formula of uni-
versalizable maxims, regardless 
of whether one interprets reason 
to mean pure logic or practical 
reason. Thus one cannot derive 
all moral rules from any single 
formula. If one attempted to de-
rive a body of rules from each 
formula individually, the three 
sets of maxims would differ 
and conflict. Since all three sets 
would be derived from reason, 
one could not rely on reason to 
decide which rules to follow; an 
arbitrary or subjective choice 
would have to be made. Kant's 
claim is then suspect that all 
three formulas are merely dif-
ferent versions of the same law, 
as reason then has not shown 
which rules are necessarily 
binding, especially if rules are 
derived from only one of the 
three formulas. Thus Kant has 
places with practical success by not established moral necessity 
within his s y s t e m . 
Reason, the basis of his moral 
structure, has led to conflicting 
rules with no way of determin-
ing which rule, if any, must be 
followedY 
This is not to say, however, 
that it is completely impossible 
to base moral necessity in rea-
son. It is possible that another 
ethical system could accom-
plish this if it gave a moral law 
from which only one set of mor-
al rules could be derived, thus 
clearly establishing that specific 
rules bind necessarily. Howev-
er, Kant's system fails to do this, 
largely because it has three dif-
ferent formulas of the categori-
cal imperative as possible start-
ing points, multiplying the odds 
that rules conflict. This failure 
means that Kantian ethical sys-
tems must be abandoned or se-
riously revised. Contemporary 
philosophers cannot simply cite 
Kantian ideas verbatim, since 
their statements could harbor 
unknown contradictions. A de-
ontological moral system might 
be preferable, but the Issues 
inherent in the Kantian system 
leave a gap in ethical philoso-
phy. A new deontology is called 
for, one based on a single rule 
that can avoid the contradic-
tions that come from multiple 
basic rules. 
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